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Long-Term Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions in ASEAN Countries 
 
Rekha Rao-Nicholson, Julie Salaber and Tuan Hiep Cao 
 
Abstract 
The study looks at mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in ASEAN countries and 
examines the post-M&A performance using data from 2001 to 2012. The industry-adjusted 
operating performance tends to decline in the 3 years following an M&A. Yet, the results 
suggest that M&As completed during the financial crisis are more profitable than those 
implemented before and/or after the crisis. We argue that this is mainly due to the synergies 
created between the firms’ resources during the crisis which augur well for firms’ economic 
performance. We find that, during the crisis, certain characteristics of the firms like the 
relative size of the target, cross-border nature of deals, acquirer’s cash reserves and friendly 
nature of deals are important determinants of long-term post-M&A operating performance. 
However, for M&As during the crisis, there appears to be no relationship between 
performance and firms’ characteristics linked to M&A activity such as payment method, 
industry relatedness and percentage of target’s share acquired.   
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we focus on intra-regional mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region. We investigate the determinants of 
post-M&A performance of companies in this region and examine the impact of the recent 
global crisis. Developed markets experienced a gloomy economic growth as a consequence 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Though the 1997-1999 Asian crisis had a profound impact 
on the ASEAN region (Sufian, 2009) and intra-regional flows decreased after 1997 (Rammal 
& Zurbruegg, 2006), Asian countries continued to grow robustly after the 2007-2008 crisis 
(Economist, 2009). With a stable and high growth rate plus a dynamic business environment, 
ASEAN has emerged to be a promising destination for international investors (UNCTAD, 
2012). Authors have suggested that, at regional level, trade agreements attempt to promote 
cross-border trade (Sufian & Habibullah, 2012). In the early 1990s, M&As were still 
relatively uncommon in Asia as these firms tend to emphasize internal development (Mitchell 
& Shaver, 2002) and the M&A market was at an early stage of development with a total 
value of $15 billion (Metwalli & Tang, 2009). The creation of ASEAN has gradually 
integrated the countries within this region. For example, Vietnam’s joining of ASEAN has 
impacted positively its bilateral trade within the region (Anwar & Nguyen, 2011). Since then 
the ASEAN region experienced rapid growth in foreign direct investment (Kindra, Strizzi, & 
Mansor, 1998), and the total value of deals reached its highest level of $135 billion in 2007 
(Metwalli & Tang, 2009). Also, authors have looked at growing foreign direct investment by 
Asian companies (Berrill & Mannella, 2013; Pananond & Zeithaml, 1998). For example, 
Thailand’s CP group utilized internationalization strategy for its survival and growth.   
For multinational companies, M&As in ASEAN market are challenging due to lack of 
supporting elements such as lawyers, accountants and advisers, which are fundamentally 
important for a successful transaction (Metwalli & Tang, 2002; Zhan & Ozawa, 2001); 
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companies might have to  depend on relational contracting which might be hard to develop in 
a new country (Indro & Richards, 2007). Moreover, the cultural difference and high 
corruption level in ASEAN countries make M&As less tempting for firms outside the region 
(Rammal & Zurbruegg, 2006). Metwalli and Tang (2002) suggest that intra-regional deals 
will continue to dominate the M&A market in Southeast Asia in the foreseeable future, 
especially with the implementation of trade agreements among ASEAN countries and the 
possibility of a currency union (Huang & Guo, 2006). Thus, it is interesting to investigate 
intra-regional M&As and their performance in ASEAN. 
Theoretically, there is a number of reasons why a company could increase its 
performance through M&A such as synergies (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), economies of 
scope and scale (Pangarkar & Lim, 2003), and greater market monopoly (Ikeda & Doi, 1983; 
Lubatkin, 1983; Sharma & Ho, 2002). In reality, many firms may suffer a decrease in 
performance from an M&A activity, as companies face several obstacles which prevent such 
benefits from being properly executed (Chakrabarti, 1990; Fang, Fridh, & Schultzberg, 2004; 
Ivancevich, Schweiger, & Power, 1987; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Schweiger & 
Denisi, 1991). Obstacles emerge at the level of people and process (Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, 
& Travlos, 2012; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). On one hand, increased 
formalization of resource allocation and other management decision areas adversely affect 
performance, and similar challenges emerge at the level of strategic capabilities (Danbolt, 
1995). On the other hand, the human aspect of M&As is equally relevant (Qiu & Wang, 
2011; Shelton, 1988). As the aborted merger between Telia (Swedish) and Telenor 
(Norwegian) shows, nationalistic sentiments and emotions embedded in employees can cause 
irreversible damages to cross-border investments (Alexandridis et al., 2012). Indeed, even the 
managers involved in the M&A process cannot predict all the issues that are likely to emerge 
during the integration phase of the deal (Schoenberg, 2006; Slangen, 2006; Very & 
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Schweiger, 2001). A review of works on accounting performance after an M&A has been 
provided in the papers by Zollo and Meier (2008), Papadakis and Thanos (2010), and Thanos 
and Papadakis (2012a, 2012b). Thus, the question of post-M&A operating performance 
improvements has been addressed by many researchers over the last three decades (Amel, 
Barnes, Panetta, & Salleo, 2004; Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Papadakis & Thanos, 2010; 
Spiegel, 2009; Zollo & Meier, 2008). Companies either experience negative or no gains from 
M&As and some studies indicate that acquirers can improve operating performance after 
M&As. 
The extant literature revolves around M&As in the USA and UK and most 
recommendations for outcomes of M&As are based on the results using samples from these 
countries as either acquirers or targets. Thus, authors have suggested a need for more 
geographically diverse samples to overcome the UK and USA bias in the field of M&A 
studies (Papadakis & Thanos, 2010; Thanos & Papadakis, 2012a). Thanos and Papadakis 
(2012a, p. 130) specifically suggest a need to look at emerging economies to understand 
whether the country of origin of acquirers has an impact on M&A performance. Our study 
contributes to the limited literature on the long-term performance of M&As in emerging 
markets by investigating whether M&As within ASEAN lead to improvements or 
deteriorations in operating performance (OP) of involved firms. Moreover, we investigate the 
relationship between changes in post-M&A performance and deal characteristics. Also, 
another important contribution of this paper is that it links the recent global crisis with the 
performance of M&As in the ASEAN region.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the summary of 
relevant literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data selection 
and employed methodologies. Section 4 summarizes the main results and examines the 
determinants of post-M&A performance. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses 
Several authors have examined whether M&As can generate positive gains for 
merging firms. In order to answer this question, authors have developed several hypotheses to 
understand the underlying motivations for M&As (Caves, 1989; Gomes, Angwin, Weber, & 
Tarba, 2013; Gugler, Mueller, & Weichselbaumer, 2012; Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, & 
Zulehner, 2003). These hypotheses assume that the managers of the acquirer and target firms 
anticipate an improvement in profitability, market power, and firm growth. The extant 
research suggests that there are a number of reasons why an M&A could improve firm 
performance through synergies (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), economies of scope and scale 
(Pangarkar & Lim, 2003), and market monopoly (Ikeda & Doi, 1983; Sharma & Ho, 2002). 
Yet, firms involved in an M&A may suffer a decrease in performance due to difficulties at 
the people and process levels (Fang et al., 2004; Schweiger & Denisi, 1991). The past and 
extant literature on post-merger OP improvements indicates positive gains in some studies 
and negative or no gains in some other studies. Overall, extant evidence offers limited 
consensus on post-M&A performance improvements (Amel et al., 2004; Healy et al., 1992; 
Meglio & Risberg, 2010; Papadakis & Thanos, 2010; Schoenberg, 2006). For a 
comprehensive review of the literature on M&A performance around the world, see for 
instance Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison (2009), Thanos and 
Papadakis (2012a, 2012b) and Zollo and Meier (2008). A summary of findings from previous 
empirical studies and their relevant features is displayed in Table 1. Panel A reviews the 
literature on post-M&A OP in developed countries, which yields different results depending 
on the sample and methodology used. Sharma and Ho (2002) assert that the inconsistency in 
prior studies might be attributable to different measures used to capture changes in OP.  
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Table 1: Summary of post-M&A operating performance studies 
Panel A:  Developed markets 
Market Sample period Author, year 
Sample  
size 
Performance  
measure Deflator  Benchmark 
Object of 
study:  
Bidder (B)  
or Target (T) 
Change 
(C) or 
Intercept 
(I) model 
Changes in post-M&A 
profitability 
US 1952-1963 
Lev and 
Mandelker, 
1972 
69 Net income, Operating income 
(1) BV Assets,              
(2) BV Equity,           
(3) Sales,                      
(4) Number of shares 
Industry, size B C No significant change 
US 1953-1964 Hogarty, 1970 43 (1) EPS (2) Capital gains Number of shares Industry B Other Deterioration 
US 1967-1987 Switzer, 1996 324 Pre-tax Cash flow MV Assets Industry B+T C+I Improvement 
US 1967-1987 Linn and Switzer, 2001 413 Pre-tax Cash flow MV Assets Industry B+T C Improvement 
US 1975-1979 Franks et al., 1988 42 
(1) Return on common 
equity (ROCE);                  
(2) Total return to 
shareholders (RSH) 
None 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
B C+I Deterioration 
US 1979-1984 Healy et al., 1992 50 Pre-tax Cash flow MV Assets Industry B+T C+I Improvement 
US 1981-1988 Clark and Ofek, 1994 38 Pre-tax Cash flow Sales Industry 
B+ 
distressed T C+I Deterioration 
US 1981-1995 Ghosh, 2001 135 Pre-tax Cash flow Adjusted MV Assets 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
B+T C+I No significant change 
US 1982-1987 Parrino and Harris, 1999 197 Pre-tax Cash flow MV Assets Industry B+T C+I 
Improvement only 
when target 
management is 
replaced following the 
M&A 
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Market Sample period Author, year 
Sample  
size 
Performance  
measure Deflator  Benchmark 
Object of 
study:  
Bidder (B)  
or Target (T) 
Change 
(C) or 
Intercept 
(I) model 
Changes in post-M&A 
profitability 
UK 1948-1977 Dickerson et al., 1997 1443 Pre-tax Cash flow 
Average of opening 
and closing net assets Industry B Other Deterioration 
UK 1985-1993 Powell and Stark, 2005 191 
Pre-tax Cash flow 
adjusted for changes in 
working capital 
(1) MV Assets;             
(2) Adjusted MV 
Assets;    
(3) BV Assets;              
(4) Sales 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
B+T C+I Improvement 
Japan 1964-1975 Ikeda and Doi, 1983  49 Pre-tax Cash flow 
(1) BV Equity                 
(2) BV Assets Industry B+T C Improvement 
Japan 1970-1974 Yeh and Hoshino, 2002 86 
ROA, ROE, Sales 
growth, Employment 
growth 
None Industry B+T Other Deterioration 
Japan 1969-1999 Kruse et al., 2007 69 Pre-tax Cash flow 
(1) MV Assets               
(2) Sales Industry, size B+T C+I Improvement 
Greece 1998-2000 Pazarskis et al., 2006 50 
Profitability, Liquidity 
and Solvency ratios None  None  B C Deterioration 
Greece 1997-2003 Papadakis and Thanos, 2010 50 ROA BV Assets Industry B+T C No significant change 
Europe 1997-2001 Martynova et al., 2007 155 
Pre-tax Cash flow 
adjusted for changes in 
working capital 
(1) BV Assets               
(2) Sales 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
B+T C+I No significant change 
Australia 1986-1991 Sharma and Ho, 2002 36 
Pre-tax Cash flow 
adjusted for changes in 
working capital 
(1) BV Assets,              
(2) BV Equity,           
(3) Sales,                      
(4) Number of shares 
Industry, size B+T C+I No significant change 
Canada 1993-2002 Dutta and Jog, 2009 1300 Pre-tax Cash flow BV Assets 
Industry, size 
and pre-
performance 
B C+I No significant change 
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Panel B:  Emerging markets 
Market Sample period Author, year 
Sample  
size 
Performance  
measure Deflator  Benchmark 
Object of 
study:  
Bidder (B)  
or Target (T) 
Change 
(C) or 
Intercept 
model (I) 
Changes in post-M&A 
profitability 
Malaysia 1988-1992 
Rahman and 
Limmack, 
2004 
113 
Pre-tax Cash flow 
adjusted for changes in 
working capital 
BV Assets Industry, size B+T C+I Improvement 
India 2003 Kumar and Bansal, 2008 74 
Working capital, 
operating profit, profit 
before tax, ROE, EPS, 
debt to equity ratios 
None  None B C Improvement 
India 1992-1995 Pawaskar, 2001 36 Pre-tax Cash flow Net Assets Industry, size B Other Deterioration 
India 1991-2003 
Mantravadi 
and Reddy, 
2008 
118 6 different financial and operating ratios None  None  B C Deterioration 
Russia 1999-2008 
Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 
2012 
609 Pre-tax Cash flow BV Assets 
Non-
acquiring 
firm 
B Other Deterioration 
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Literature on emerging markets (Panel B) is scarce despite the fast growth of M&A 
activity in these countries. In line with developed-market studies, this literature does not yield 
a homogeneous answer. Two Indian studies (Mantravadi & Reddy, 2008; Pawaskar, 2001) 
document a profitability deterioration of bidding firms following a takeover, whereas Kumar 
and Bansal (2008) show significant improvement in post-M&A profitability of acquirers. 
Evidence from Malaysian firms reveals that takeovers are usually associated with a positive 
change in long-term OP (Rahman & Limmack, 2004). Since our sample of ASEAN countries 
include Malaysia, we should expect to find a significant improvement in OP after the M&A 
(Rahman & Limmack, 2004).  
H1: The ASEAN firms’ M&A in this region significantly improved its OP.  
The extant literature has suggested that deal characteristics like method of payment 
(Boisot & Child, 1988; Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Haleblian et al., 2009; Jarrell & 
Poulsen, 1989; Lindgren, Garcia, & Saal, 1996; Metwalli & Tang, 2009), industry relatedness 
(Boisot & Child, 1988; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Healy et al., 1992; Jarrell & Poulsen, 
1989; Metwalli & Tang, 2009; Sheng, 1996), geographic diversification (Aguiar & Gopinath, 
2007; Chen, 2011; Wang & Boateng, 2007), acquirer’s cash reserves (Jarrell & Poulsen, 
1989; Lindgren et al., 1996; OECD, 2010), target’s size (Alexandridis et al., 2012; Boisot & 
Child, 1988; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Lubatkin, 1983; Mantravadi & Reddy, 2008; Qiu & 
Wang, 2011), and percentage of target acquired (Mantravadi & Reddy, 2008) all impact the 
performance of M&As. Also, recent studies have shown that the turbulences in the business 
environment can have a significant impact on bidder’s returns (Beltratti & Paladino, 2013; 
Rao-Nicholson & Salaber, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Wan & Yiu, 2009). Thus, it is interesting to 
look at the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on the OP of M&As in ASEAN. Though, 
typically, a financial crisis can have a negative effect on the company’s profits, authors have 
also recognized good M&A opportunities that present themselves in such an environment 
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which can lead to improvement in profitability (Krugman, 2000; Mody & Negishi, 2000; Wan 
& Yiu, 2009). For example, during an economic slump, firms are able to acquire targets at a 
lower price due to adverse economic conditions. Wan and Yiu (2009) suggest that a crisis 
provides acquirers with an altered – more abundant – set of opportunities, and companies that 
spot these opportunities and aggressively pursue them will perform better. From the 
perspectives of the resource-based view and dynamic capabilities, M&A during a crisis can be 
viewed as a way to alter firms’ resources and capabilities in order to better adapt to the fast 
changing environment (Wan & Yiu, 2009). In the context of the 1997-1999 Asian crisis, the 
authors find that M&As are positively related to firm performance during the crisis, and 
negatively related to performance before and after the crisis. Hence, we formulate several 
testable hypotheses looking at the combined impact of deal characteristics and crisis period on 
post-M&A performance. 
2.1. Method of payment 
 
Irrespective of the firm’s motivations behind cash or stock method for a deal, studies 
have shown that cash-financed deals are relatively more beneficial to bidding firms (Haleblian 
et al., 2009). Cash offers can lead to a higher profitability improvement than transactions 
financed with equity or a mixture of securities (Ghosh, 2001; Linn & Switzer, 2001). Cash 
deals give managers incentives to use resources of combined firms more efficiently than 
stock-swap transactions (Jensen, 1988). In competing bids, a cash offer could help acquirers 
accomplish the deal faster without any costly delay, making sure they are able to capture the 
high synergistic value (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1990). In the ASEAN context, cash is likely 
to be used in M&As as acquiring companies are likely to have superior information about the 
targets. Yet, during the crisis we might observe valuation mismatch between the acquirer and 
the target leading to stock-financed M&As. For Thai firms, authors have observed that firms 
with the highest debt-equity ratios suffered the most devaluation during the crisis due to their 
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capital structure and financial leverage effect (Dekle & Hoontrakul, 2004). M&As driven by 
low value assets might not be motivated by superior information or synergies (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984); thus, impacting post-M&A performance.  
H2: Cash-financed M&As are likely to generate higher post-M&A OP than stock-financed M&As. 
H2a: During the crisis period, stock-financed deals are likely to negatively impact the OP of 
firms involved in M&As. 
2.2. Industry relatedness 
 
M&As within the same industry can be linked to firms’ need for absorbing resources 
essential for competitive advantage and firm profitability. The occurrence of M&As between 
firms in the same industry can considerably change the business environment for surviving 
firms in that industry (Haleblian et al., 2009). For example, it can increase consolidation and 
generate excess rents from limited competition in the industry. Also, customers of the target 
firm, due to reduced commitment to the newly created firm, might examine the market for 
new suppliers, thus creating growth opportunity for survivor firms. These actions of 
customers might impact the profitability of the firms after M&A activity (Berger, Saunders, 
Scalise, & Udell, 1998). The findings on industry commonality and takeover effect on OP 
tend to suggest that M&As of firms operating in different industries are normally associated 
with poorer performance compared to industry-related peers (Healy et al., 1992; Jensen, 
1986). However, Ghosh (2001) and Kruse, Park, Park, and Suzuki (2007) find opposite 
results. Furthermore, some studies document no relationship between an M&A and the 
combined firms’ OP (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007; 
Powell & Stark, 2005). Within ASEAN countries, there is a high likelihood that acquirers 
who engage in M&A activity with industry-related targets could swiftly utilize their 
established understanding of these markets and leverage their combined capabilities for 
mutual benefit, and thus, improve post-M&A performance. On the contrary, during the crisis 
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period, diversification could help overcome industry-level contagion. Thus, M&As within a 
sector could have a negative impact on post-M&A OP.  
H3: Same-industry M&As are likely to positively and significantly impact the OP of M&As. 
H3a: During the crisis, same-industry M&As could have a negative impact on OP. 
2.3. Geographic diversification 
 
The probability of cross-border M&As depend on several factors including bilateral 
trade between the two countries and currency exchange rates (Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012). 
Authors have argued that geographical diversification can greatly benefit the firms’ economic 
performance (Erel et al., 2012; Indro & Richards, 2007). Wang and Boateng (2007) 
conjecture that cross-border M&As make firms less vulnerable to international dynamics. 
Beside new resources and customers, foreign targets are also good opportunities for acquiring 
firms to learn new knowledge and improve their competence (Shimizu et al., 2004). With 
such advantages, it can be expected that cross-border M&As will increase the likelihood of 
synergy realization and improve profitability as observed by Wang and Boateng (2007). 
However, empirical studies also suggest that when going abroad, firms might face a number 
of challenges, which could potentially impede the accomplishment of expected synergistic 
value and even deteriorate the performance of acquiring firms (Kling & Weitzel, 2011; 
Moeller & Schlingemann, 2004). The lack of organizational capabilities has been shown to 
negatively affect international M&As of Russian companies (Bertrand & Betschinger, 2012). 
Gomes et al. (2013) highlight the importance of cross-cultural sensitivity and communication 
in cross-border M&A; and lacking these skills, the firms involved in M&A activity could 
experience integration issues. In our study, we consider only intra-regional deals; hence, we 
argue that the benefits of cross-border deals will overshadow any negative influences 
emerging from institutional differences between target and bidder countries. Yet, during the 
crisis, regional contagion might impede value accrual for cross-border M&As.  
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H4: Cross-border deals are likely to increase OP of firms engaged in M&As as compared to 
domestic deals. 
H4a: During the crisis, companies’ performance will be hurt by cross-border M&As as 
opposed to domestic deals.  
2.4. Acquirer’s cash reserves 
 
According to the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986), a high level of free cash 
holding could increase the agency costs of firms since the managers tend to get involved in 
value-destroying investments. The author suggests that M&As by cash-rich firms are likely to 
result in operating underperformance relative to those implemented by firms with limited cash 
holdings. The empirical evidence seems to confirm this conjecture (Harford, 1999; Martynova 
et al., 2007). This effect is likely to be more acute during the crisis as prudent companies seek 
to maximize their cash reserves.  
H5: Cash-rich firms are likely to engage in M&As that can negatively impact their OP as 
compared to cash-poor firms. 
H5a: During the crisis, deals executed by cash-rich firms are more likely to cause a decrease 
in post-M&A OP. 
2.5. Relative size of target 
 
Corporate theories suggest that deals of relatively large targets are likely to bring 
operating and financial advantages, therefore leading to stronger profitability improvement 
compared to smaller targets (Martynova et al., 2007). Moreover, M&As that involve 
relatively large targets enable bidders to quickly take advantage of valuable assets such as 
strong market position, well-recognized branch, and established distribution network 
(Alexandridis et al., 2012). However, managers of bidding firms may find it more difficult to 
assimilate large targets into a combined entity and much of the issues related to large deals 
has been attributed to managerial hubris which may influence the decision to target larger 
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rather than smaller firms for M&A (Haleblian et al., 2009). Also, the growing size of a 
company engaged in M&A could potentially impact the cost of bureaucracy within a 
company (Bertrand & Betschinger, 2012; Indro & Richards, 2007). Most prior empirical 
research found no significant relation between relative size of target and post-M&A OP 
(Chatterjee, 2000; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Powell & Stark, 2005; Sharma & Ho, 2002). In 
the ASEAN region, acquirers invest largely in their own region and engage with known 
targets; hence enabling them to mitigate any negative impact of size of target in deriving 
synergies from M&As. During the crisis, it might be even more beneficial for acquirers to 
focus on large targets with which they share synergies.  
H6: The relative size of the target is likely to have a positive impact on post-M&A OP.  
H6a: During the crisis, the relative size of the target will have an even stronger impact on 
post-M&A OP.  
2.6. Target share acquired 
 
The percentage of target share acquired in a M&A directly determines the extent to 
which bidding firms could exercise their control over the target (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Gershon, 
1992; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Travlos, 1987). A deal that leads to a majority shareholding in 
the target enhances the likelihood of the realization of efficiency combination that could 
consequently lead to profitability improvement (Mantravadi & Reddy, 2008). Consistent with 
previous hypothesis on the size of the target, this effect is likely to be more acute during the 
crisis when bidders want to derive potential synergies from their M&As.  
H7: The percentage of target share acquired has a positive impact on post-M&A OP.  
H7a: During the crisis, the percentage of target acquired will have an even stronger impact on 
post-M&A OP. 
2.7. Friendly versus neutral M&As 
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Friendly M&As, i.e., agreed between acquirer and target managements, are likely to 
create synergies as compared to other types of deals (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Sheng, 1996). Typically M&As invoke a higher degree of friendly managerial reactions 
(Huang & Walkling, 1987). In their study, authors find that 38% of the target management 
took neutral position as compared to 49% of target management who expressed favorable 
attitude. Authors have also argued that companies from emerging economies like India and 
China prefer friendly deals over other types of deals (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). We 
argue that this can be equally true for ASEAN countries. This is especially true during the 
crisis, where friendly deals can help quick assimilation of synergies between the merging 
companies.  
H8: Friendly M&As will experience performance improvements as opposed to non-friendly 
deals. 
H8a: During the crisis, friendly deals will experience stronger performance improvements. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection  
Our study focuses on M&A activity within ASEAN countries over the period 2001-
2012. We include domestic as well as cross-border transactions, and both target and bidding 
firms are publicly listed companies. The details of each transaction were extracted from the 
SDC Platinum of Thomson Financial Securities Data Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. The data includes transaction value, percentage of shares acquired and owned after 
the transaction, country and industry of each bidder and target, deal attitude and mode of 
payment. Financial deals are excluded. We also eliminate transactions from multiple bidders 
who are involved in more than one deal over the sample period. 
In addition, to be included in the sample, bidding and target firms need to have 
accounting data available for at least one year before and after the takeover. OSIRIS database 
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was used to collect accounting data up to three years prior and subsequent to each transaction. 
Hence we selected deals that were completed between 2004 and 2009 and collected 
performance data for the years 2001-2012. This procedure is consistent with empirical 
research in this area as OP induced from corporate takeovers might not materialize for several 
years (Healy et al., 1992).  
3.2. Sample description  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our final sample of 57 M&As. Panel A shows 
a drop in M&A activity in ASEAN in 2006-2007, although the total transaction value is 
highest in 2007. M&A activity is recorded in six ASEAN countries. Panel B shows that 
Malaysia is the most prolific acquirer country (30% of deals). For the mode of payment, a 
third of the takeovers are undertaken using cash only (Panel C). Regarding takeover strategies 
(Panel D), the sample is divided between focusing (30%) and diversifying transactions (70%). 
Moreover, the majority of transactions in our sample involve relatively large targets (Panel 
E). Table 2 Panel F shows that domestic deals dominate our ASEAN sample as only 19% of 
the deals involve cross-border takeovers.   
We define cash reserves as cash equivalents of the bidder divided by its book value of 
total assets, measured in the year prior to the transaction. Table 2 Panel G shows that the level 
of cash reserves is fairly distributed among deals and that M&As completed by cash-rich 
bidders are not uncommon. Also, there is an equal distribution between majority deals where 
bidders end up owning more than 50% of the target and minority deals where less than 50% 
of the target is controlled after the M&A (Panel H). In Panel I, we split the sample into three 
sub-periods, Pre-crisis includes M&As completed from 2004 to 2006; Crisis includes 
transactions from 2007 and 2008; and Post-crisis comprises deals in 2009. Finally, Panel J 
shows that 75% of ASEAN deals are friendly, which is consistent with our discussion in 
section 2.7. 
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Table 2: Sample description 
Panel A: Completion year 
  No of deals Percent (%) Deal value ($ million) Percent (%) 
2004 13 23% 429 8% 
2005 10 17% 414 8% 
2006 5 9% 646 12% 
2007 4 7% 2482 47% 
2008 14 25% 1024 19% 
2009 11 19% 333 6% 
            
  No of deals Percent (%)   No of deals Percent (%) 
Panel B: Acquirer country Panel F: Location of deals  
Malaysia 17 30% Domestic 46 81% 
Thailand 14 24% Cross-border 11 19% 
Singapore  12 21% 
Indonesia 5 9% Panel G: Pre-M&A bidder cash reserves 
Vietnam 5 9% Cash Q1 15 26% 
Philippines 4 7% Cash Q2 17 30% 
Cash Q3 10 18% 
Panel C: Mode of payment  Cash Q4 15 26% 
Cash only 19 33% 
Stock only 6 11% Panel H: Target share acquired 
Mixed 5 9% Minority deals 27 47% 
Other/unknown 27 47% Majority deals 30 53% 
      
Panel D: Industry relatedness Panel I: Financial crisis   
Consolidation 17 30% Pre-crisis 28 49% 
Diversification 40 70% Crisis 18 32% 
Post-crisis 11 19% 
Panel E: Relative size of target    
Small target 14 25% Panel J: Deal attitude  
Medium target 12 21% Friendly 43 75% 
Large target 31 54% Neutral 14 25% 
 
Notes: In Panel E, small, medium and large mean that the size of the target (as a proportion of the size of the 
acquirer) is less than 10%, between 10-20% and more than 20%, respectively. In Panel G, the four quartiles of 
pre-M&A cash reserves are Q1: less than 5%; Q2: 5-10%; Q3: 10-15% and Q4: more than 15%. 
 
3.3. Performance measures 
Several post-M&A accounting-based performance measures have been used in extant 
literature (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best, 1998; Papadakis & 
Thanos, 2010; Schoenberg, 2006; Zollo & Meier, 2008). The rationale for using accounting-
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based measures to evaluate the post-M&A performance relies on the assumption that most 
deals are geared towards deriving higher performance for merging firms and this synergy 
between firms is best observed by looking at long-term accounting measures such as the 
return on assets (Hitt et al., 1998; Papadakis & Thanos, 2010; Thanos & Papadakis, 2012b). 
Thanos and Papadakis (2012a) suggest that one of the prime motives of M&As is to exploit 
the potential synergies between the merging companies and most of these synergies take 
number of years to realize. Thus, the M&A performance can be visible in accounting-based 
measures over a period of time. Also, authors have argued that using multiple measures in a 
single study gives a more holistic view of the post-M&A performance (Thanos & Papadakis, 
2012a). Hence, following Bertrand and Betschinger (2012), Papadakis and Thanos (2010) and 
Boisot and Child (1988), we calculate two measures of post-M&A performance: the 
combined return on assets (ROA), measuring the firms’ profitability, and the combined sales 
margin, providing a picture of the firms’ effectiveness (Thanos & Papadakis, 2012a). 
We utilize the pretax cash flow as accounting-based performance measure, which is 
defined as sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling, general, administrative expenses, plus 
depreciation (Healy et al., 1992; Sudarsanam, 2003). Rather than using raw operating cash 
flow, the usual approach is to deflate them before and after the deal, in order to make 
financial ratios comparable between companies and over time. Common bases used to scale 
operating cash flows are the book value of assets and sales (Clark & Ofek, 1994). Hence we 
calculate two cash flow returns of the combined firm (i) for each year (t): 
Return on assets  ܴܱܣ௜,௧ = 	 ஼ி೔,೟஺ௌௌா்ௌ೔,೟  
Sales margin  ܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ,௧ = 	 ஼ி೔,೟ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟ 
where CF is the pretax cash flow (EBITDA), ASSETS is the book value of total assets and 
SALES is the total revenues of the combined firm at the end of the year. For the years before 
the M&A, we aggregate accounting figures of target and bidding firms. Following test 
 19
techniques designed by Martynova et al. (2007), pre-M&A cash flow returns of the combined 
firm are calculated as the sum of cash flows of both firms scaled by the sum of their total 
assets or sales at the end of the year.  
We do provide a cautionary note that our measures are not without limitations as 
highlighted by several authors (see Papadakis & Thanos, 2010 for a review). The main 
concern about using such accounting measures is the fact that they represent aggregate data 
for the whole organization (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 2007). Yet, given the context of our 
study which is similar to the one observed in Papadakis and Thanos (2010), i.e., similar to 
their study the M&A market in consideration in this study is a relatively new phenomenon, 
and thus, the M&A-related decision-making might be more intuitive than analytical. Also, 
given the low M&A intensity of our sampled firms which do not engage in multiple M&A 
activities during the period of our study, we believe that there are potentially few confounding 
events than those observed for UK and USA firms undertaking M&A activities.  
3.4. Performance benchmarks 
In order to isolate the impact of the M&A on OP, we need to find a relevant 
benchmark for each transaction. We use two benchmarks selected on the basis of industry, 
size and pre-M&A performance. Our first benchmark controls for industry effects (Healy et 
al., 1992). Hence, a separate industry portfolio is formed for each acquirer and target firm, 
which consists of all firms with the same two digits SIC code. To control for industry size, the 
pool of firms is reconstructed every year. The firm with the median value of operating cash 
flow return is then selected as the industry median control firm. Our second benchmark also 
controls for firm size as well as pre-M&A performance (Dimson & Marsh, 1986; Ghosh, 
2001). To construct industry, size and pre-M&A performance benchmarks, we first group 
firms by industry. Then, only firms with size (book value of total assets) that falls within the 
same quartile as the sample firms are retained. Finally, the firms with the profitability return 
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closest to our sample firms are selected as control benchmarks. Our sample firms are carefully 
removed from the benchmark portfolios. 
For each deal, the median values of OP before and after the M&A (for both sample 
and control firms) are selected. Then the adjusted OP is calculated by subtracting the median 
performance of control firms from that of sample firms. 
Two performance measures and two control benchmarks give us four adjusted 
measures of OP: IAROA is the industry-adjusted return on assets, IAMARGIN is the industry-
adjusted sales margin, ISPAROA is the return on assets adjusted for industry, size and pre-
M&A performance, and ISPAMARGIN is the sales margin adjusted for industry, size and pre-
M&A performance. 
ܫܣܴܱܣ௜ = ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܴܱܣ௜,௧ −݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܴܱܣ௜௡ௗ_௣௘௘௥ ,௧ 
ܫܣܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ = ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ,௧ −݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ௡ௗ_௣௘௘௥,௧ 
ܫܵܲܣܴܱܣ௜ = ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܴܱܣ௜,௧ −݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܴܱܣ௜௡ௗ_௦௜௭௘_௣௘௥௙_௣௘௘௥ ,௧ 
ܫܵܲܣܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ = ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ,௧ −݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	ܯܣܴܩܫ ௜ܰ௡ௗ_௦௜௭௘_௣௘௥௙_௣௘௘௥ ,௧ 
Each performance measure is calculated before and after the transaction, and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test will be employed to test whether the change in adjusted 
profitability of the combined firm is statistically significant following the M&A.  
3.5. Cross-sectional analysis 
We then perform a multivariate analysis to look at the effect of each variable on our 
adjusted performance measures. Hence we regress our four measures of post-M&A OP on 
various deal characteristics and control variables, based on the following cross-sectional OLS 
model: 
i

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
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where ADJ_PERFi(post) is the post-M&A adjusted performance of the combined firm 
(measured by IAROAi, IAMARGINi, ISPAROAi, and ISPAMARGINi) and ADJ_PERFi(pre) is 
the pre-M&A adjusted performance of the combined firm. STOCKi is a dummy variable equal 
to one when the deal is all stock financed, zero otherwise (we alternatively use CASHi as a 
dummy capturing all cash-financed deals). SAMEINDi is a dummy variable taking the value 
one when both bidder and target firms have same first two SIC digits. CBi is a dummy equal 
to one for cross-border deals, zero otherwise. CASH_RESERVEi is the level of pre-M&A cash 
reserves of the acquirer as defined in section 3.2. RELATIVESIZEi measures the size of the 
target relative to the size of the bidder. PERC_OWNEDi represents the percentage of target 
share owned after the transaction. FRIENDLYi is a dummy variable which equals one for 
friendly deals, zero otherwise. Finally, CRISISi is a dummy capturing the effect of the global 
crisis, i.e., it is equal to one for deals completed in 2007 and 2008.  
We also investigate the combined impact of the crisis and deal characteristics by 
interacting the dummy CRISIS with all other variables in the model. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Change in operating performance 
Table 3 shows the post-M&A changes in OP for our different performance measures. 
Specifically, findings indicate that M&As in ASEAN countries have a detrimental impact on 
both raw performance and adjusted performance of merging firms. This decrease in OP is 
significant for IAROA (equal to -2.25%), which is consistent with previous empirical studies 
(Clark & Ofek, 1994; Dickerson, Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997). However, the fact that other 
measures do not yield any significant difference between pre- and post-M&A performance 
supports the conjecture of Sharma and Ho (2002).  
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Table 3: Changes in operating performance  
  Pre-M&A  Post-M&A  Difference  
Raw performance    
ROA 10.58 9.53 -0.55 
MARGIN 13.86 14.11 -0.07 
    
Industry-adjusted performance    
IAROA 1.60 (a) -0.33 -2.25** 
 (38) (25) (17) 
IAMARGIN 1.75 (b) 0.96 (c) -0.69 
 (31) (31) (26) 
    
Performance adjusted for industry, size and pre-M&A performance 
ISPAROA -0.26 -0.53 -1.04 
 (28) (27) (27) 
ISPAMARGIN -0.78 -0.95 2.24 
  (26) (25) (32) 
 
Notes: Percentage of positive values is reported in brackets. 
(a)/(b)/(c) significance at 1%, 5%, 10% using Wilcoxon ranked test which shows that combined firm’s performance 
is significantly different from benchmark’s performance. 
***/**/* significance at 1%, 5%, 10% using Wilcoxon ranked test which shows that the median post-M&A 
performance is significant different from the median pre-M&A performance. 
 
Another important finding presented in Table 3 is that merging firms significantly 
outperform their respective industry benchmark before the M&A (+1.6% for IAROA and 
+1.75% for IAMARGIN). This implies that, on average, firms in ASEAN countries are likely 
to engage in M&As during a period when they experience a superior level of OP relative to 
the industry. For the years subsequent to the transaction, merging firms continue to retain a 
higher level of performance (measured by IAMARGIN) but to a smaller extent. This finding is 
in line with empirical evidence from other studies (Heron & Lie, 2002; Kruse et al., 2007; 
Martynova et al., 2007; Rahman & Limmack, 2004) and reinforces the suggestions of Ghosh 
(2001) that empirical studies should take into account the pre-event performance of merging 
firms when selecting control benchmarks.  
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Table 4: Deal characteristics and changes in operating performance 
  IAROA IAMARGIN   ISPAROA ISPAMARGIN 
Cash only -3.2** -2.9  -2.9 -3 
Mixed -1.7 -1.2  4.2 3.3
** 
Stock only -3.5 0.8  -1.8 2.6 
Diff (Cash - Stock) 0.3 -3.7  -1.1 -5.6 
Consolidation -1.9 -1.4  1.7 2.6 
Diversification -2.5** 1.1  -1.4 2.1 
Diff (Cons - Div) 0.6 -2.5  3.1 0.5 
Large target -2.2** -1.4  -0.5 1.9 
Medium target -1.4 3.2***  2.3 3.6 
Small target -2.9 -2  -2.8 2.1 
Diff (Large - Small) 0.7 0.6  2.3 -0.2 
Cross-border -1.9 -1.7  -1 2.8 
Domestic -2.3** -0.4  -1.2 2.1 
Diff (CB - Domestic) 0.4 -1.3  0.2 0.7 
Cash Q1 -3.0** -2  -2.5 -3.2 
Cash Q2 -1.1 -1.7  3.0
** 1.9 
Cash Q3 -2.2 -0.4  -1.9 2.7 
Cash Q4 -1.1 3.3  -1.6 7.8 
Diff (Q4 - Q1) 1.9 5.3  0.9 11 
Minority deals -1.9** 2.9  -2.5 2.8 
Majority deals -2.3 -1.2  0.4 1.9 
Diff (Minority - Majority) 0.4 4.1*  -2.9 0.9 
Friendly deals -2.3** -0.4 -1.1 2.7* 
Neutral deals -2 -2.1 0 -1.6 
Diff (Friendly - Neutral) -0.2 1.7 -1.1 4.4* 
Pre-crisis -2.8** -2.2  -1.5 -0.5 
Crisis -0.6 3.2**  5.4 6.0** 
Post-crisis -3.2 1.1  4.6 0.6 
Diff (Post - Pre) -0.4 3.3  6.1** 1.1             
 
Notes: Small, medium and large target mean that the size of the target (as a proportion of the size of the acquirer) 
is less than 10%, between 10-20% and more than 20%, respectively. The four quartiles of pre-M&A cash 
reserves are Q1: less than 5%; Q2: 5-10%; Q3: 10-15% and Q4: more than 15%. 
***/**/* Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. Wilcoxon ranked test was used to test for the statistical significance 
of the change in operating performance (median post-M&A performance minus median pre-M&A performance). 
Mann-Whitney test was used to test for the statistical difference in performance changes between sub-groups of 
deals.  
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4.2. Deal characteristics 
This section focuses on discovering the sources of OP of merging firms. Changes in 
OP for different sub-groups of deals are presented in Table 4.  
First, the adjusted profitability does not differ significantly between cash-financed and 
stock-financed M&As, which is consistent with prior empirical studies (Healy et al., 1992; 
Heron & Lie, 2002; Martynova et al., 2007; Powell & Stark, 2005; Sharma & Ho, 2002). 
Also, the combined offer of cash and stock is associated with significantly positive changes in 
performance (ISPAMARGIN). Second, focusing M&As are not able to generate more 
synergistic benefits for merging firms than diversifying ones, consistent with previous studies 
(Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Martynova et al., 2007; Powell & Stark, 2005). Third, the change 
in OP is statistically the same between small and large targets. Fourth, geographic scope of 
business expansion does not help explain the sequent changes in post-M&A performance in 
ASEAN.  
Fifth, the change in OP does not significantly differ for cash-rich and cash-poor 
companies, which is in contrast with other studies (Harford, 1999; Martynova et al., 2007). 
Sixth, results for the percentage acquired do not provide any evidence that majority deals 
significantly outperform minority deals. We find the opposite result for IAMARGIN. Seventh, 
friendly M&As provide significantly better OP improvements when ISPAMARGIN is used. 
Finally, we test whether economic downturn would have any impact on OP by 
comparing pre-crisis and post-crisis deals. Results for ISPAROA show that post-crisis M&As 
benefited from a higher increase in performance than pre-crisis transactions. Moreover, 
takeovers during the crisis were associated with a significant increase in sales margin 
(IAMARGIN and ISPAMARGIN). 
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Table 5: Correlation table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 IAROA(post) 1.00 
2 IAROA(pre) 0.673 1.00 
3 IAMARGIN(post) 0.583 0.393 1.00 
4 IAMARGIN(pre) 0.453 0.613 0.563 1.00 
5 ISPAROA(post) 0.703 0.393 0.413 0.14 1.00 
6 ISPAROA(pre) 0.251 0.673 0.16 0.383 0.342 1.00 
7 ISPAMARGIN(post) 0.282 0.10 0.723 0.13 0.513 0.17 1.00 
8 ISPAMARGIN(pre) 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.423 0.08 0.262 0.19 1.00 
9 CASH -0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.09 0.05 0.282 -0.03 0.21 1.00 
10 STOCK 0.06 0.23 -0.02 0.18 0.00 0.122 -0.20 0.02 -0.24 1.00 
11 SAMEIND 0.01 -0.12 -0.07 0.03 -0.10 -0.14 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.10 1.00 
12 CB 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.231 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 0.12 -0.03 1.00 
13 CASH_RESERVE 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.10 0.241 0.221 0.251 0.01 0.18 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 1.00 
14 RELATIVESIZE 0.01 -0.07 0.18 -0.07 0.16 0.03 0.20 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.18 0.12 1.00 
15 PERC_OWNED 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.483 0.292 0.13 -0.15 -0.15 1.00 
16 FRIENDLY -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.08 0.07 -0.01 -0.363 -0.12 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.25 1.00 
17 CRISIS 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.13 -0.17 0.13 -0.13 -0.241 0.01 -0.20 0.05 0.11 0.15 -0.17 0.04 
                                    
 
Significance level of each correlation coefficient: 3 p<0.01, 2 p<0.05, 1 p<0.1
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Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of post-M&A operating performance 
 IAROA(post) IAMARGIN(post) ISPAROA(post) ISPAMARGIN(post) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
ADJ_PERF(pre) 1.020*** 1.138*** 0.819*** 0.761*** 0.588** 0.613* 0.286 0.198 
 (0.165) (0.180) (0.222) (0.210) (0.289) (0.318) (0.254) (0.272) 
CASH  -1.682  -3.786  -0.655  -3.425  
 (2.077)  (3.237)  (2.396)  (4.372)  
STOCK  2.043  3.744  0.069  2.011 
  (2.728)  (3.862)  (2.968)  (5.391) 
CRISIS*STOCK  1.815  6.116  6.120  17.67 
  (4.448)  (6.394)  (5.673)  (11.22) 
SAMEIND 2.004 3.668 -1.346 1.156 -0.563 -1.077 2.183 0.349 
 (2.701) (3.880) (4.234) (5.243) (2.559) (3.379) (5.269) (6.495) 
CRISIS*SAMEIND  -4.636  -18.12**  1.414  -12.93 
  (4.791)  (8.465)  (3.897)  (10.50) 
CB 0.809 1.566 1.303 3.016 1.684 2.548 -3.404 3.668 
 (2.083) (2.941) (4.915) (4.676) (2.757) (3.436) (8.035) (6.184) 
CRISIS*CB  -5.079  -12.66  -4.655  -32.94* 
  (4.166)  (11.44)  (5.504)  (19.46) 
CASH_RESERVE 0.0648 0.105 0.129 0.246 0.117 0.132 0.299 0.374 
 (0.110) (0.168) (0.145) (0.158) (0.181) (0.287) (0.272) (0.362) 
CRISIS*CASH_RESERVE  -0.291  -0.999***  -0.251  -1.290** 
  (0.215)  (0.304)  (0.333)  (0.574) 
RELATIVESIZE 0.003 -0.013 0.024 0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.029 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.022) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.030) (0.022) 
CRISIS*RELATIVESIZE  0.050***  0.081*  0.037*  0.122 
  (0.014)  (0.047)  (0.019)  (0.077) 
PERC_OWNED 0.019 -0.027 -0.006 -0.006 0.034 0.026 -0.003 0.043 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.065) (0.074) (0.042) (0.041) (0.095) (0.092) 
CRISIS*PERC_OWNED  0.042  -0.161  -0.016  -0.280 
  (0.069)  (0.113)  (0.084)  (0.202) 
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FRIENDLY  -1.651 -0.832 0.682 -6.357 -0.523 -0.501 1.262 -7.645 
 (2.669) (2.864) (3.653) (4.449) (2.455) (2.558) (4.444) (6.065) 
CRISIS*FRIENDLY  -0.548  22.38***  0.104  20.46** 
  (4.477)  (6.244)  (4.859)  (9.297) 
CRISIS  1.246  3.035  3.298  4.313  
 (1.889)  (4.344)  (2.632)  (6.709)  
Constant -2.544 -3.129 -1.094 -0.509 -4.130 -3.473 -4.806 -1.963 
 (3.556) (2.876) (5.170) (4.130) (3.252) (4.011) (6.561) (7.744) 
         
Observations 57 57 56 56 57 57 56 56 
R-squared 0.480 0.560 0.412 0.608 0.203 0.260 0.150 0.343 
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.399 0.297 0.461 0.051 -0.011 -0.016 0.097 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3. Cross-sectional analysis 
In this section, we explore the combined effect of the determinants of the post-M&A 
performance in a multivariate framework. Table 5 presents the correlation coefficients (and 
statistical significance) among all our variables. We do not observe any significant 
correlations that could bias our analysis. 
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional analysis for each 
performance measure and for different combinations of the independent variables. The 
dependent variable is the post-M&A adjusted OP (IAROA, IAMARGIN, ISPAROA, and 
ISPAMARGIN) and ADJ_PERF(pre) is the corresponding pre-M&A performance. In this 
analysis, robust standard errors (White estimator) were used. Models with odd numbers report 
coefficient estimates without interaction between variables, and even-numbered models report 
the results including crisis interaction terms. Across specifications, pre-M&A OP has a strong 
and positive impact on post-M&A performance, which is expected. The fact that the statistical 
significance of ADJ_PERF(pre) decreases for ISPAROA and disappears for ISPAMARGIN is 
also expected, as these measures of performance are already adjusted for pre-M&A 
performance. Over the entire sample period, we observe that none of the deal characteristics 
have a significant impact on post-M&A OP. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this 
changes during the crisis period. Indeed, several coefficients become statistically significant 
when deal characteristics are interacted with the CRISIS dummy. 
On one side, SAMEIND, CB and CASH_RESERVE have a negative impact on post-
M&A performance (measured by sales margin) for deals completed during the crisis. These 
results are consistent with our hypotheses H3a, H4a and H5a, as well as previous empirical 
evidence (Harford, 1999; Kruse et al., 2007; Martynova et al., 2007; Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2004). Hence, during bad economic times, ASEAN firms should concentrate 
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on diversifying M&As within their own borders. Moreover, during crisis, a large amount of 
cash holding is particularly detrimental for acquirers. 
On the other side, RELATIVESIZE and FRIENDLY both impact positively the post-
M&A performance of transactions completed in 2007-2008. These findings support our 
hypotheses H6a and H8a, as well as existing studies (Martynova et al., 2007; Morck et al., 
1988; Shelton, 1988; Sun et al., 2012). ASEAN firms are able to generate extra performance 
from friendly M&As with large targets only during the crisis period. Finally, we do not find 
support for H2a (stock-financed deals) and H7a (percentage of target owned).  
4.4. Robustness checks 
We undertook a series of tests to verify the robustness of our results. First, we used 
CASH as an explanatory variable instead of STOCK. The interaction between CASH and 
CRISIS doesn’t offer any statistical significance. Similarly, we removed from the regression 
the explanatory variables that were not significant, namely STOCK (CASH) and PERC_ 
OWNED. Our results remain similar. Second, we removed the control variable 
ADJ_PERF(pre) from the regression to account for the fact that ISPAROA and ISPAMARGIN 
are already adjusted for pre-M&A performance. Results are similar to those presented in the 
paper. Finally, instead of regressing ADJ_PERF(post) on ADJ_PERF(pre) and other 
variables, we directly used the difference in adjusted performance as the dependent variable. 
Following other studies (Ramaswamy, 1997; Zollo & Singh, 2004), we calculated for each 
deal the difference between post-M&A and pre-M&A performance and tried to explain the 
change using our explanatory variables. Again our conclusions remain unchanged. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper contributes to the literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in 
emerging markets by investigating post-M&A performance of ASEAN companies over 2001-
2012. Using various measures of adjusted operating performance (OP) and conducting both 
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univariate and multivariate analyses, we find, on average, a deterioration of post-M&A 
performance of the combined firms as measured by the return on assets. This result is 
consistent with previous studies where authors find a negative impact of M&A activity 
(Alexandridis et al., 2012; Bertrand & Betschinger, 2012; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; 
Danbolt, 1995; Indro & Richards, 2007; Kindra et al., 1998; Kumar & Bansal, 2008; 
Pawaskar, 2001; Qiu & Wang, 2011; Shelton, 1988; Shimizu et al., 2004; Zhan & Ozawa, 
2001). When taking into consideration the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, from the 
multivariate analysis, we find that the decrease in performance is particularly significant for 
M&As that are engaged in cross-border deals and have high cash reserves and observe 
negative effect of diversification for deals during this period. These findings are consistent 
with prior works (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; OECD, 2010; Sheng, 1996). We find positive 
impact of relative size and friendly deals on post-M&A OP (Alexandridis et al., 2012; Jarrell 
& Poulsen, 1989; Morck et al., 1988; Sun et al., 2012). This result is particularly interesting 
as it shows how the crisis can affect the long-term performance of M&As in ASEAN 
countries. Moreover, our results help explain that inconsistent findings across previous 
empirical studies may be the result of differences in adjustment bases, performance measures 
or model specifications. For instance, our results significantly differ when using return on 
assets and sales margin.  
Our findings have several managerial implications. In times of crisis, managers can be 
expected to do well if they focus on their domestic markets and access domestic firms for 
M&As. The argument in favor of this domestic consolidation would be the growth in market 
power which might help firms weather the crisis in their business environment. Also, during 
the crisis, managers must prudently focus on strengthening their capabilities in their core 
sector and avoiding unnecessary diversification through M&As. Finally, managers might 
want to focus on deals that are friendly and where the target’s board and employees are 
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amicable to M&A. Indeed friendly deals help in the easier integration of the two companies 
and managers can work proactively to derive sooner synergistic gains from their M&A 
activity.  
It is acknowledged that the current study has a number of limitations; therefore the 
results may not provide a comprehensive picture in understanding the long-term OP of 
M&As. In particular, companies selected in this study were restricted to publicly listed firms. 
Thus, future studies should try to include private acquirers as well as targets. This will help 
identify the differences between the M&A dynamics of private and public acquirers and 
targets. Moreover, this study used extant methodology of analyzing changes in OP three years 
following the M&A. Yet, it is not clear whether merging companies can derive all the 
synergistic value within this timeframe, and studies over a longer period will provide an 
insight into M&A performance in ASEAN. Hence, we suggest that future research should 
look to undertake an analysis over a longer time horizon, e.g. up to 7 years. In this study we 
present a holistic view of the M&A activity within ASEAN region, and do not examine the 
global M&A activities of firms from this region. For instance do ASEAN firms engage more 
actively in M&As within this region as compared to the rest of the world? Also, we do not 
investigate the micro-foundations of these M&A activities Are there any micro-founded 
reasons for this? For example are managers in this region more likely to link through ethnic 
communities and diaspora (e.g. Chinese ethnic communities) and engage in regional M&A 
activities than managers in other regions?  
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